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RECENT ILLINOIS DECISIONS.
DIVORCE-JURISDICTION, PROCEEDINGS AND RELIEF-WHETHER ATTOR-
NEY FOR PETITIONER MAY RE-OPEN DIVORCE PROCEEDING, DISMISSED ON
STIPULATION OF PARTIES, TO ENFORCE PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY'S FEE--A
point of some concern to practicing lawyers has been made in the recent
case of Hefner v. Hefner.' Petitioner had there acted on behalf of the
plaintiff in the preparation and filing of a suit for divorce. He was,
during the pendency of the proceeding, notified by his client that his
retainer was terminated but no substitution of attorneys was made. Not
long thereafter, the case was dismissed on a stipulation signed by the
plaintiff and the defendant, as well as by defendant's attorney. More
than thirty days after dismissal had occurred, petitioner took steps to
have the order of dismissal vacated and sought an order fixing the amount
of his fees. The trial court reinstated the case, determined the value of
petitioner's services and ordered payment of such fee by both plaintiff and
defendant. On appeal from that order, the Appellate Court for the First
District reversed because (1) there was no basis, under the Divorce Act,
for the court to make an award in favor of the attorney against his own
former client,2 and (2) because it was the firm public policy of the state,
in the interest of the preservation of marriages, to put no stumbling blocks
in the path of a possible reconciliation.3 The attorney was, therefore,
remitted to any separate action he might have against either his client
or the defendant, or both. The case invokes interest for the reason that
the statute, although it now gives to the attorney a personal right to
enforce payment of an award made for attorney's fees, 4 still apparently
fails to insure him of protection, other than by a suit on the contract of
employment,5 in the event the plaintiff should insist on the right to dismiss
the action.6
1 Sub nom. Petition of Runke, 338 Ill. App. 179, 80 N. E. (2d) 885 (1949).
2 The court noted that Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Ch. 40, § 16, which is the source
of the court's authority to fix fees in divorce cases, limits that authority to the
making of an award to be paid by the opposite party.
3 Watson v. Watson, 335 Ill. App. 637, 82 N. E. (2d) 671 (1948).
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 40, § 16, as amended by Laws 1947, p. 818, S. B. No.
417, permits the court to make the award direct to the attorney and to grant
execution thereon. As to the former practice, see Anderson v. Steger, 173 Ill. 112,
50 N. E. 665 (1898).
5 Recovery against the husband under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 68, § 15, on the
theory of a family expense, would seem unavailable because the parties were
not living together at the time the service was rendered: Featherstone v. Chapin,
93 Ill. App. 223 (1901).
6 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 176, regulating the voluntary dismissal of a suit,
would not seem to prevent such action for, if reconciliation has occurred, the
defendant would undoubtedly consent thereto despite any cross-complaint which
may have been filed.
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FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES--TRANSFERS AND TRANSACTIONS INVALID-
WHETHER OR NOT SALE OF MINOR PORTION OF STOCK AND EQUIPMENT TO
ONE AND SIMULTANEOUS SALE OF BALANCE THEREOF TO ANOTHER REQUIRES
APPLICATION OF BULK SALES AcT-An interesting conflict arose in
Corrigan v. Miller,' between a judgment creditor of the vendor and a
vendee who had purchased a minor portion of a stock of goods, not in
the ordinary course of trade, without formally complying with the pro-
visions of the Bulk Sales Act.2 It appeared that the vendor, whose
ex-wife had obtained a judgment against him for accrued alimony, had
been operating a combined rubber tile and marble contracting business.
He sold the rubber tile stock and equipment to Corrigan for approximately
one-third of the aggregate price, paid in cash, but transferred the marble
contracting business to another for the remaining two-thirds of the total
price, payable in notes. After the ex-wife had levied on the stock and
equipment which composed Corrigan's share of the purchase, he filed a
claim for the return of the property so seized. A trial court judgment
in his favor was reversed by the Appellate Court for the Second District
when it determined that the statute applied because the two sales, having
occurred simultaneously and being within the knowledge of the two
purchasers, really amounted to a single transaction involving substantially
all of the vendor's business stock and equipment. 3
It is clear that the statute would be applicable had the two vendees
purchased jointly for the term "vendee" is, by another section of the
statute, defined to include the plural of that term so long as the several
persons are "party on any sale." 4 But such was not the situation in the
instant case for each buyer purchased for himself, paying his own con-
sideration and taking his own bill of sale. It is likewise clear that the
sale to the other purchaser fell within the statute for, judging by the
disproportionate amount paid, he had purchased at least the "major part"
of the vendor's business.5 It is not clear, however, whether the result
1338 Ill. App. 212, 86 N. E. (2d) 853 (1949).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121Y, § 78. The statute purports to apply to the
sale, in bulk, of the "major part or the whole" of a stock of merchandise or other
goods and chattels. (Italics added.) It is not confined to merchandising opera-
tions and may extend to a farmer's sale of his livestock: Coon v. Doss, 361 Ill.
515, 198 N. E. 341, 102 A. L. R. 561 (1935).
3 The report of the case does not indicate that the purchasers, other than being
employees of the vendor, in any way were aware of his intention to depart from
the vicinity promptly after the sale so as to defeat the enforcement of the alimony
judgment. For that matter, no claim was advanced that the two sales were based
upon an insufficient consideration. It is difficult, therefore, to read into the case
any desire on the part of the purchasers to help out in a known fraudulent trans-
action.
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121Y, § 80.
5 That term has been defined to mean more than one-half, for a sale of a 50%
interest in a business is not within the statute: Zenith Radio Distributing Corp. v.
Mateer, 311 Ill. App. 263, 35 N. E. (2d) 815 (1941).
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attained as to Corrigan is to be predicated on (1) his knowledge of the
other purchase, or (2) on the fact that he bought an entire and distinct
department of the vendor's business. If the former, then the simultaneous
nature of the purchases is hardly significant except as it serves to prove
his knowledge. A purchase of a minor share of a business by one who
knows that his vendor intends, the next day, to sell the balance would,
according to this case, come within the comprehension of the statute and
would force such purchaser to attend to its requirements. If the latter,
it does not appear from the legislative language that a vendor is to be
regarded as having several businesses, particularly not at one location,
merely because he may have departmentalized his operations. The decision,
therefore, is one which will bear close scrutiny.
INSURANCE-CONTROL AND REGULATION IN GENERAL-WHETHER
FAILURE OF LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY TO OBTAIN OFFICIAL APPROVAL FOR
CONTRACT PROVISIONS, THEREBY EXPOSING IT TO A STATUTORY PENALTY,
SERVES TO INVALIDATE THE UNAPPROVED PROVISIONS-Suit to recover the
face amount due under a life insurance contract was begun, in Dempsey
v. National Life & Accident Insurance Company,1 by the named bene-
ficiary. The company answered by setting up a military service limitation
contained in the policy and alleged that the insured had died on Bataan
Peninsula in the early days of World War II while in the armed forces.
It offered a return of the premiums paid under the contract. Plaintiff
replied that (1) the insured had been prevented, by the emergency of
the Japanese invasion of the Philippine Islands, from complying with the
military service rider;2 (2) that the rider was inoperative as a binding
contract provision because of ambiguity and indefiniteness; and (3) was
illegal and void because the consent of the Director of Insurance had not
been obtained to the insertion thereof in the contract.3 Decision having
passed in favor of the beneficiary for the face of the policy, the insurance
company appealed. The Appellate Court for the First District ordered
reversal when it decided, for the first time in this state, that failure to
obtain official consent to the contract provisions did not serve to in-
validate the same. Its holding in that regard is probably justified by
1338 Ill. App. 109, 86 N. E. (2d) 871 (1949). Feinberg, P. J., wrote a dissenting
opinion. He was of the opinion that the rider relied on by way of defense was
invalid for ambiguity, citing Arendt v. North American Life Ins. Co., 107 Neb.
716, 187 N. W. 65 (1922). His dissenting opinion is silent on the point here con-
sidered.
2 The court did not pass on the sufficiency of this excuse for non-compliance.
Presumably, the insured was not excused by reason of any impossibility of per-
formance caused by war-time conditions.
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 73 § 755, states that no company "shall issue or de-
liver .. . a policy or . . . attach an endorsement or rider thereto . . . until the form
and consent of such ... rider ... has been filed with and approved by the Director."
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reason of the saving effect of Section 442 of the Insurance Code4 but it
is worthy of notice, if for no other reason, because of the contrast it
provides to the holding in Mikelson v. Kolb,' pronounced in the same
district. In each case, the failure to observe statutory requirements exposed
the violator to penalties,6 but the contract was held enforcible in the one
and not enforcible in the other. From the standpoint of the substantial
equities involved, the balance would seem to favor the converse result.
SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS-DIsTRICT PROPERTY, CONTRACTS AND
LIABILITIES--WHETHER HOLDER OF POSSIBILITY OF REVERTER OF LAND HELD
FOR SCHOOL PURPOSES ONLY IS ENTITLED TO IMPROVEMENT ERECTED
THEREON BY SCHOOL DISTRICT UPON CESSATION OF USE OF LAND FOR SCHOOL
PuRPosEs-The facts in Low v. Blakeney' disclosed that the ancestor of
the plaintiffs, in 1869, had conveyed an acre of Illinois land to certain
school trustees "for school purposes only" with specific stipulation for
the reverter "of the said one acre of land" in the event such use should
thereafter cease. A school house was erected on the premises and was used
for many years. In 1945, the trustees abandoned the use of the land and
took steps to sell and remove the structure so erected. 2 Plaintiffs, claiming
ownership of the land and the building, sued to enjoin the proposed sale.
The school trustees did not contest the reverter of the feel but did contend
that plaintiffs had acquired no right in the building. Upon dismissal of
plaintiffs' petition, an appeal was taken directly to the Illinois Supreme
Court.4 That court, two justices dissenting, affirmed on the ground that
(1) there was indication, from the language of the deed of an intention
to retain a possibility of reverter in the land alone because of the presence
of the words "said one acre of land," but that (2) an interpretation of
4 Ibid., Ch. 73, § 1054, does state that any rider form "issued without submitting
the same for approval ... shall nevertheless be valid."
5337 Ill. App. 493, 86 N. E. (2d) 152 (1949), noted ante under Discussion of
Recent Decisions.
6 Compare Section 446 of the Insurance Code, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 73, § 1058,
with Section 5 of the "assumed name" statute, ibid., Ch. 96, § 8.
1403 Ill. 161, 85 N. E. (2d) 741 (1949). Crampton, J., wrote a dissenting opinion
concurred in by Thompson, J.
2 The earlier case of Hackett v. School Trustees, 398 Ill. 27, 74 N. E. (2d) 869
(1947), presenting a somewhat similar situation, is distinguishable on the ground
that the grantor there concerned reserved only an option to repurchase the prem-
ises whenever the school use should terminate rather than a possibility of re-
verter. The recent extensive consolidation that is going on among the school
districts may be productive of even more variations of the problem, for grantors
have not been uniform in their language.
3 But note the possible application of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 30, §§ 37e-37f.
That statute provides that, after its date, no right of re-entry or possibility of
reverter shall be valid for more than fifty years, nor shall any such right more
than fifty years old be regarded as enforcible. See also Denissen, "The Illinois
Reverter Act," 36 Ill. B. J. 263-71 (1947).
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 199.
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Section 22 of Article 4 of the School Code5 revealed a legislative intent
that school buildings erected on land conveyed for school purposes only
should be and remain personalty both as to title and as to sale or other
disposition. The common law doctrine that structures affixed to the soil
are generally to be regarded as a part thereof, hence would go with the
title in case of reverter, appears to have been subjected to modification,
at least where school lands are concerned.
TAXATION-REDEMPTION FROM TAX SALE--WHETHER OR NOT OWNER
MAY REDEEM FOR LESs THAN AMOUNT Bm AT TAx SALE WHERE SALE
CERTIFICATE HAS BEEN AssIG_>---The case of Dupuy v. Morsel required
the Appellate Court for the Fourth District to give interpretation to the
redemption provisions of the so-called Scavenger Act 2 as the same applied
to a situation wherein plaintiff's land had been sold for the payment of
ten years of delinquent taxes and had been purchased, at the sale, by the
county in which the land was located. The county had thereafter sold
and assigned the certificates of purchase to the defendant for amounts
substantially less than the amount bid at the sale. Plaintiff, desiring to
redeem, asserted the right to do so at the price paid by the assignee, plus
certain other items like subsequent taxes, interest, fees and court costs.
Defendant insisted on payment of the bid price. The trial court, in a
suit to compel redemption, believing that the plaintiff, in equity, should
be entitled to redeem at the lower figure, so ordered. Its decree, on appeal,
was reversed and remanded with a direction that the trial court should
comply with the specific requirements of the redemption section of the
Revenue Act.3 As the assignment of a certificate of purchase vests in
the assignee all the rights and title of the original purchaser, it would
seem reasonable that the assignee should be able to demand all that the
assignor could have claimed. While sympathy for the taxpayer might lead
to the approval of the position taken by the lower court, it is believed
that the rule adopted accomplishes the legislative purpose of replacing
delinquent property on the tax rolls. Encouraging the purchase of tax
sale certificates by third persons, even though the discount will cause
some present loss of revenue, will insure more stable governmental income
for the future. Any other holding would have left the county government
without revenue from the property until it was able to acquire a clear
title and dispose of the fee.
5 Ibid., Ch. 122, § 4-22.
6 Matzan v. Griffin, 78 Ill. 477 (1875).
1337 Ill. App. 1, 85 N. E. (2d) 187 (1949).
2 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 120, § 716a.
3 Ibid., Ch. 120, § 734. That statute specifies that redemption shall be for the
amount for which the land was sold together with penalties. Section 716a makes
cross reference thereto but makes some modification in the penalty provisions.
It is otherwise silent on the subject of the problem posed in the instant case.
